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Administrative Law-Constitutional Law-Judicial
Review of FTC Remedial Orders Restricting
Commercial Speech
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC*
I. Introduction
Deceptive sales practices are unlawful under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.' Parties found guilty of deceptive practices are subject
to restraining and remedial orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). The FTC found Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. guilty of deceptive
sales practices and issued restraining and remedial orders requiring that
specific disclosures be made by salesmen attempting to obtain admission into
customers' homes. The order further required that specific disclosures be
placed upon all lead-getting material. Although it did not contest the finding of
guilt, Britannica appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit for a review of the remedial order. 2 In Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Inc. v. FTC3 the Seventh Circuit allowed the remedial order to stand. In so do-
ing the court (1) undermined the requirement that the FTC select the least
restrictive remedy, (2) infringed upon Britannica's constitutionally protected
speech, and (3) dispensed with the requirement that the FTC adequately ar-
ticulate its reasons for a chosen remedy.
II. Statement of the Facts
On December 11, 1972, the Federal Trade Commission issued a com-
plaint against Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. and its subsidiary, Britannica
Home Library Services, Inc.,4 charging numerous deceptive practices 5 in
violation of section 5 of the FTCA. 6 On December 16, 1974, after trial hear-
ings, the administrative law judge entered extensive findings, conclusions and
* 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979).
1 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1976).
2 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)(1976) provides, in pertinent part, that: "The judgment and decree of the court
shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari."
3 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979).
4 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in
Chicago. As is widely known, Britannica publishes, sells, and distributes encyclopedias, textbooks, general
reference works, and other educational and literary products throughout the world. The primary sales
method is direct selling at the homes of customers. Id. at 966.
5 "[The complaint] charged deceptive practices in recruitment of sales representatives, in sales presen-
tations to members of the public, in obtaining leads to persons who will allow Britannica sales represen-
tatives into their homes, in seeking subscriptions to book promotions, and in collection procedures." Id.
6 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). At the time this proceeding was instituted, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) provided, in
pertinent part, that: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce, are declared unlawful." As noted by the Britannica court, this section, since the institution of
the proceedings against Britannica, has been amended in ways not relevant to Britannica's appeal. 605 F.2d
at 966 n.j. In 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) was amended by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 2183, which substituted "in
or affecting commerce" for "in commerce" wherever appearing therein.
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a remedial order. The administrative law judge found that Britannica's
salesmen had utilized numerous devices to disguise the purpose of their initial
contact with consumers. These deceptive devices were approved by
Britannica's management and salesmen were trained by Britannica to use such
devices effectively.
7
The remedial order required Britannica salesmen, upon initial contact
with the consumer, to present a card to the consumer indicating the salesman's
purpose. The order dictated the precise size of the card, the size of the type and
the exact words to be used.
8
The administrative law judge also found Britannica's lead-getting ac-
tivities deceptive. Magazine, direct-mail advertisements and contest entry
cards used solely to obtain names of prospects for salesman contact inadequate-
ly disclosed the fact that respondents would be contacted by Britannica's
salesmen. The administrative law judge found that such advertisements affir-
matively misled the public into thinking all materials and information would
come by mail while the sole purpose of the activities was to obtain leads to
prospects. 9
The order required the reply card to disclose clearly and conspicuously
that anyone replying might be contacted by a salesman. Like the order requir-
ing a card to be presented upon initial contact, the order requiring warnings on
lead-getting material dictated specifics regarding the warning's placement in
the advertisement as well as the exact wording and size of the print to be
used. 10
On March 9, 1976, the FTC issued an order affirming the administrative
law judge's findings. Britannica petitioned the Seventh Circuit for a review of
the order. 1 Britannica did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the findings of violation, nor did it challenge the propriety of the remedial
order. Rather, Britannica focused its attack on those provisions of the order re-
quiring very specific disclosures on initial contact with prospective c. stomers
and specific disclosures on lead-getting material. Britannica argued tha (1) the
disclosures ordered were not the least restrictive means of curing the deception,
(2) the order constituted an infringement upon Britannica's constitutionally
protected speech, and (3) the FTC failed to articulate adequate reasons for its
7 605 F.2d at 967. "One ploy used to gain entrance into prospects' homes [was] the Advertising
Research Analysis questionnaire. This form questionnaire [was] designed to enable the salesman to disguise
his role as a salesman and appear as a surveyor engaged in advertising research. [Britannica] fortifie[d] the
deception created by the questionnaire with a form letter from its Director of Advertising-for use with
those prospects who may question the survey role. These questionnaires [were] thrown away by salesmen
without being analyzed for any purpose whatsoever." Id.
8 Britannica must not attempt door-to-door sales unless a card 3 inches by 5 inches in dimension, with
all words in 10-point boldface type, with the following information, and none other, in the indicated order is
presented to such person: "(1) the name of the corporation; (2) the name of the salesperson; (3) the term
'Encyclopedia Sales Representative' [or other applicable product]; (4) the terminology: 'The purpose of this
representative's call is to solicit the sale of encyclopedias' [or other applicable product). Id.
9 Id. at 968.
10 The order provided that all solicitation materials must "clearly and conspicuously disclose the
following statement in 10-point boldface type: NOTICE TO CONSUMER-PERSONS WHO REPLY
AS REQUESTED MAY BE CONTACTED BY A SALESPERSON FOR THE PURPOSE OF SELL-
ING [insert name of applicable product]." The order likewise required that all return cards must contain
the same warning "in immediate proximity to the space provided for signature." Id. at 969.
11 15 U.S.C. S 45(c) (1976) provides, in pertinent part, that: "Any person, partnership, or corporation
required by an order of the Commission to cease and desist from using any method of competition or act or
practice may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States ......
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chosen remedy.1 2 After considering and rejecting each of Britannica's
arguments, the court voted two to one, Judge Wood dissenting,, to affirm the
FTC's order.
III. Judicial Review of Remedial Orders
A. The Legislative and Judicial Background
The FTC has been given wide latitude in policing unfair and deceptive
trade practices. 13 This is largely because of the nature and intent of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 14 The legislative history of the FTCA indicates that
Congress intended the statute's definition of "unfair" and later "deceptive'15
trade practices to be vague. "The term 'unfair' was used deliberately because
of its vagueness.' 16 The courts have recognized the generality of the FTCA
17
and have granted the FTC wide latitude in enforcing the statute.
The courts, however, have not given the FTC unrestricted discretion.
Courts require the FTC to use the least restrictive alternative in formulating
remedial orders. In FTC v. Beneficial Finance Corp. I the FTC ordered the defen-
dant to refrain from using a heavily promoted and patented name for one of its
loan campaigns. Advertisements had been made publicizing an "Instant In-
come Tax Refund" loan. The loan was in fact no different in its qualification
requirements or interest rates than Beneficial's other consumer loans. The
Third Circuit refused to enforce the order, asserting that careful contextual
wording could clarify any possible misconception created by the copyrighted
phrase. The court concluded that by failing to consider rewording of the adver-
tisements and ordering total excision, the FTC had abused its "remedial
discretion" by failing to use the least restrictive remedy available.1 9 The deci-
sion was based on the requirement that the least restrictive remedy be used,
20
as well as the court's reluctance to regulate constitutionally protected speech.
21
12 605 F.2d at 970. Britannica also argued that the Commission abused its discretion in its method of
enforcement and that Britannica did not have an opportunity to rebut information it believed the Commis-
sion considered in setting the remedy. The last two issues are not treated in this comment. The court
discussed Britannica's fourth allegation in a manner that added little to their general discussion of the FTC's
discretion. The fifth issue was tangential to the central holding and thus outside the scope of this comment.
13 Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946).
14 See Moog Indus., Inc., v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) where the Supreme Court, taking into account
what it saw as "the scope of administrative discretion that Congress has given the Federal Trade Commis-
sion," concluded that "the Commission alone is empowered to develop that enforcement policy best
calculated to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress." Id. at 413.
15 As originally enacted, § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38
Stat. 719, proscribed only "unfair" trade practices. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the FTCA, of 1938,
ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, provided for the inclusion of the term "deceptive" trade practices.
16 Note, Recent Positions of the Federal Trade Commission, 5 Loy. CHi. L.J. 537, 538 (1974).
17 See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965), where the Supreme Court reviewed the
history of the FTCA and stated that "It is important to note the generality of these standards of illegality;
the proscriptions of § 5 are flexible .. " Id. at 384-85.
18 542 F.2d 611, 619-20 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
19 Id. at 620.
20 SeeJacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946) and FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212
(1933) for development of the basic principle that remedial orders should go no further than is reasonably
necessary to correct the evil and preserve the rights of competitors and the public.
21 See note 33 infra.
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B. The Seventh Circuit's Treatment of FTC Discretion in Remedial Orders
The Seventh Circuit began by reasserting the principle that the FTC is an
"expert body" deserving "wide latitude for judgement." 22 The court also ad-
mitted that FTC orders may be altered if they bear no reasonable relation to
the unlawful practices in question, and that less restrictive remedies may be
substituted by courts when such remedies would further the same interests as
the ones proffered by the Commission. 23 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the requirements of the order were "reasonably related to the deceptive
practices found." 24 The court went on to state that they did not "think Britan-
nica seriously contends that required disclosure in some form is an improper
remedy, and the choice the Commission made as to form and content of the
disclosure could not be deemed an abuse of discretion.
' 25
While it is true that Britannica did not contend that any form of remedy
was improper, 26 it is equally true that Britannica did contend that the "form
and content of the disclosures" constituted an abuse of the Commission's
discretion. The court failed to comment, however, upon the form and content
of the disclosures. Rather, the court simply concluded that the remedy chosen
was "well within the range," citing no authority or otherwise defining "the
range.' '27 By refusing to consider expressly the truly unique facet of the order,
particularly the requirement that salesmen present customers with oversize
cards warning consumers that the salesman is about to attempt to sell en-
cyclopaedias, the court has granted the FTC unwarranted discretion.
IV. Britannica's First Amendment Rights
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine2 8
Commercial speech is "speech that does no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction." ' 29 Originally the characterization of an expression as com-
mercial speech deprived that expression of any first amendment protection. In
more recent cases, however, first amendment protection has been extended to
some, but not all commercial speech.30 The Third Circuit has concluded that
the remedy for a deceptive practice violation can go no further in imposing a
prior restraint on protected commercial speech than is reasonably necessary to
accomplish the remedial objective .- '
Constitutional protection of commercial speech is not, however, without
limits. There is no constitutional right to promulgate and distribute false or
22 605 F.2d at 970.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 971.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 969.
27 Id.
28 See generally Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine and the First Amendment, 12 TuLSA L.J. 699-730 (1977).
29 National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1977).
30 See note 33 infra.
31 542 F.2d at 619.
[February 1980]
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misleading advertisements. 32 Thus, regulation of false or misleading speech is
permissible.
33
The Supreme Court has recently taked a narrow view of commercial
speech as a protected form when violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act 34 are
involved. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 35 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court held that a professional society could be enjoined from
expressing the opinion that job bidding was unethical. The Court noted that
although the order might curtail the exercise of liberties that the defendant
might otherwise enjoy, such restriction is the necessary and unavoidable conse-
quence of the Sherman Act violation. 36 The Court concluded that in fashioning
a remedy, the district court could, of course, consider the fact that its injunc-
tion would impinge upon rights that would otherwise be constitutionally pro-
tected, but those protections would not prevent it from remedying the antitrust
violations.
37
Commercial speech is to be restricted only to the extent necessary to pro-
tect the governmental interest. 38 The Seventh Circuit, however, has recently
given the consumer's interest in obtaining truthful information a high priority.
In National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC,39 in which the Seventh Circuit
modified orders requiring positive disclosure to remedy misleading advertising,
the court concluded that the consumer's interest in obtaining accurate informa-
tion is served by insuring that the information is not false or deceptive and, in
fact, coincides with the public interest served by regulation. "The scale," the
court asserted "is tipped in favor of regulation. ", 40 Thus, there is some indica-
tion that the Seventh Circuit seems willing to resolve doubts as to the constitu-
tionality of an attempt to regulate commercial speech in favor of the
consumer's need for truthful information.
B. The Britannica Court's Response
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Britannica from three other cases involv-
ing conflicts between FTC orders and first amendment protection of commer-
cial speech. The court distinguished National Commission on Egg Nutrition4 1 by
saying that the FTC's order to Britannica, unlike the one made to the National
Commission on Egg Nutrition, did not require Britannica to argue the other
side of an issue. National Society of Professional Engineers42 was similarly dispensed
32 See Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 1963).
33 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
34 15 U.S.C. 55 1-7 (1976).
35 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
36 Id. at 697.
37 Id. at 697-98.
38 542 F.2d at 619-20.
39 See note 29 supra. The court found an order overbroad in that it went beyond requiring a party to cor-
rect misleading statements made about cholesterol and its relation to egg consumption. In effect, the order
required the party to argue the other side of the debatable cholesterol issue.
40 570 F.2d at 162.
41 See note 29 supra.
42 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
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with. Finally, Beneficial4 3 was distinguished because the FTC's order to Britan-
nica did not require Britannica to delete a copyrighted phrase.
44
According to the Britannica court, the FTC order merely directed truthful
disclosure of Britannica's purposes. Significantly, the court failed to address
the truly unique fact of the Britannica case, i.e., requiring a salesman to pre-
sent a larger than business card sized warning card to a prospective customer.
The court simply refused to pass on the constitutionality of virtually placing
words in a salesman's mouth. The court then reasserted its belief that such an
order was "the least restrictive alternative which [would] adequately further
the legitimate governmental interest of the prevention of deception." '4 5 The
court's failure to address the true nature of Britannica's objections to the order
is additional evidence that the balance between commercial speech and regula-
tion of sales practices has tipped toward regulation.
46
V. The FTC's Duty to Articulate Reasons for Its
Choice of Remedial Orders
A. The Rationale
The requirement that the FTC articulate its reasons for its chosen remedy
is a consequence of the FTC's status as an expert body. In Gilbertville
Trucking,47 a case involving complex antitrust remedies, the Supreme Court
refused to pass on the appropriateness of the FTC's order since the FTC had
not made sufficiently specific findings. 48 The Court made clear that prereq-
uisite to such review is evidence that the FTC did in fact exercise their expert
judgement and that the proper standards were applied.4 9 To the Court, the im-
portance of such findings was based on more than an academic concern for pro-
cedural regularity. Citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 50 the Court con-
cluded that only when the FTC had exercised its judgement and issued its con-
sidered opinion was the propriety of its remedy ripe for review.
51
B. The Seventh Circuit's Response
In Britannica, the Seventh Circuit found that the FTC had adequately ar-
ticulated its reasons for choosing the particular form of disclosure. In so doing,
43 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
44 605 F.2d at 973.
45 Id.
46 570 F.2d at 162.
47 Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115 (1962).
48 In Gilbertville, the FTC had declared informal defacto management of two common carriers in a com-
mon interest a violation of 5 5. The FTC ordered the violation terminated and ordered one appellant to
divest himself of his stock in one of the two common carriers. This divestiture order was overturned by the
Supreme Court.
49 371 U.S. at 130. Seealso FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 480-94 (1952) (Jackson,J., dissenting)
(for an extended discussion of the FTCA). Justice Jackson argues for "guiding yardsticks" to be developed
by the FTC to render complete what he views as unfinished law. Id. at 482-85. According toJusticeJackson,
if the FTC fails to perform its essentially legislative function by articulating reasons for its holdings, the
litigation involved in reviewing FTC orders will do nothing more than "promulgate an inaccurate partial
paraphrase of [the FTCA's] indeterminate generalities." Id. at 492.
50 See note 53 infra.
51 371 U.S. at 131.
[February 1980]456
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the court took a fairly liberal view of the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act 52 and distinguished a case holding that reasons for particular
remedial provisions must be articulated.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
The Administrative Procedure Act requires that all FTC decisions include
a statement of findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefore, on
all material issues of discretion presented on the record. 53 The court, having
"set out or summarized" the "findings, conclusions and comments" of the ad-
ministrative law judge and the FTC54 concerning the deceptive practices,
found that the record evidenced sufficiently articulated reasons for the remedial
orders. Significantly, the court admitted that the administrative law judge and
the FTC had made no express comparison between Britannica's suggested less
restrictive forms of disclosure and the form adopted. 55 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that there was the "clearest implication" from the remarks in the
record that the alternatives had been considered and had been found ineffec-
tive. 56 The court concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act did not re-
quire the court to set aside the order because the FTC "did not expressly make
the comparison. " 57 Clearly, such a conclusion falls far short of the stringent re-
quirements placed upon the FTC in Gilbertville Trucking.58 By allowing the
Commission to articulate its reasons by "implication," however strong, the
court seemed to have made impossible a valid judicial determination that the
FTC did in fact exercise its expert judgement.5 9
2. The Burlington Case
The Court cited Burlington Truck Lines v. United States6" as a case faulting
the Interstate Commerce Commission for failing to justify its choice between
two different but adequate remedies. 61 First, the court distinguished Burlington
from Britannica by asserting that in Burlington there were two equally adequate
remedies while in Britannica the FTC had "clear, though not expressly
52 See note 58 infra.
53 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. Law No. 404, § 8(b), 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 557(c) (1976) which provides, in pertinent part, that:
The record shall show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception presented. All deci-
sions, including initial, recommended, and tentative decisions, are a part of the record and shall
include a statement of-
(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of
fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and
(B) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.
54 605 F.2d at 971.
55 See cases cited at note 20 supra for a discussion of the requirement that the FTC choose the least
restrictive remedy.
56 605 F.2d at 971.
57 Id. at 972.
58 371 U.S. 115 (1962).
59 371 U.S. at 130.
60 371 U.S. 156 (1962). The case involved judicial review of an Interstate Commerce Commission
order that short-haul common carriers be granted operating authority over routes ordinarily serviced by
labor-stricken long-haul carriers. The Court reversed the order since there were no findings that other less
restrictive remedies would not suffice.
61 605 F.2d at 971.
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stated'62 reasons to adopt one remedy over the other. Second, the court
distinguished Burlington by asserting that the choice was between two "quite
different" remedies, although in Britannica the "matters at issue [were] only
the form of disclosure to be required." 63 That both of these distinctions address
only tangentially the principal holding of Burlington (that a Commission must
make particular findings before a court may review an order) underscores the
Britannica court's intention to require the FTC to do no more than imply that a
less restrictive remedial alternative was in fact considered and found insuffi-
cient.
VI. Judge Wood's Dissent
In his dissent 64 Judge Wood disagreed with the majority's notion that the
remedy was "well within the range. "65 To Judge Wood the issue was whether
Britannica's suggestion that a business card and a warning of their own choice,
rather than the FTC' s requirements of a particular card and a particular warn-
ing constituted adequate disclosure of Britannica's sales purpose. In Judge
Wood's words, "Britannica [had] suggested acceptable alternative measures
which the company viewed as not offending legal and constitutional
standards. "66
Although the majority refused even to state clearly Britannica's position
on review, 67 the dissent dealt specifically with the effect the order would have
on Britannica's door-to-door sales:
It seems to me that to require a salesperson to use the warning card will sug-
gest to many prospects that the sales representative and his company are af-
flicted with some strange market place malady. Even prospects who are pre-
disposed to acquire for themselves and families the wealth of information
found in an encyclopaedia may be expected to turn to some competitor who
does not exhibit such abnormal and strange commercial behavior. 68
Judge Wood then reiterated the principle that there must be specific sup-
port for any finding of a need for an exceptional remedy. 69 Finally, the dissent
concluded with Judge Wood's stating he would deny enforcement of the FTC's
order and demand a more appropriate remedy to be supported by rational
analysis.
Thus, the difference between the majority and the dissent was that the
majority believed that because the remedy was not unique, it warranted
neither close review by the court nor specific justification by the FTC. The dis-
sent, however, considered the remedies to be virtually unheard of in door-to-
door sales, unwarranted by the record and enforceable only upon explicit find-
62 Id. at 972.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 977-78.
65 Id. at 971.
66 Id. at 977.
67 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
68 605 F.2d at 977.
69 Id. at 977-78.
[February 1980]
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ings that a less restrictive remedy would not suffice. Ultimately, the split of opi-
nion is explainable only upon principles of policy: the majority favoring strict
regulation and aggressive consumer protection, the minority trusting of
business's will to mend its occasionally errant ways.
VII. Conclusion
Because the Seventh Circuit's holding in Britannica gives the FTC a
relatively free hand in regulating sales practices, the decision raises serious
questions regarding the continued viability of the restrictions placed upon the
FTC's exercise of its remedial discretion. Although Britannica may be indicative
of a growing trend toward more determined FTC control of sales practices,
70 it
is more likely an instance of overaggressive regulation in which the FTC has
exceeded its powers. 71 In either case, the decision warrants review by the
United States Supreme Court to clarify the present status of the FTC's power
to regulate sales practices. The Court would be justified in reversing the
Seventh Circuit's approval of the FTC's remedial orders in Britannica on the
grounds that the remedial orders (1) are not the least restrictive alternative, (2)
are not constitutionally permissible, or (3) are not adequately justified by
specific findings.
William D. Fearnow
70 See Note, Reducing Consumer Ignorance, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 309 (1975) for a discussion of the need for
the development of a systematic FTC approach to deceptive practices. See also UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES
PRACTICES ACT 5§ 1-19 (adopted in Kansas, Ohio, and Utah); UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
§5 1-9 (1966 Act) (adopted in Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, and
Oregon); UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT §5 1-9 (1964 Act) (adopted in Delaware, Illinois,
Maine, and Oklahoma).
71 See The Administrative Practice and Regulatory Control Act of 1979, S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), and the Regulation Reform Act of 1979, S. 755, H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), two
regulatory reform bills in Congress which would require agencies to use the least restrictive alternative in
rule making. See also TIME, Dec. 3, 1979, at 84, for an article on "a congressional revolt" to control the
FTC's "regulation run amuck."
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